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Summary 
 
Climate change is representative of a general class of environmental issues where decisions have to 
be taken under controversies. The policy framework for these kinds of decisions is defined by three 
important traits: scientific ignorance, mediatization and the need for innovation. Scientific ignorance 
is an issue here because decisions must be taken before the end of scientific controversies about the 
predictability of future climate. Mediatization is key because agents can't have a sensible experience 
of the global climate change, and some interest-holders (future generations, distant countries) cannot 
participate directly in the decision. Third, the need for innovation is crucial because today's 
technology offers the only alternative between fossil fuels and nuclear power as a main primary 
energy source. 
 
In the case of climate change, the institutional context is the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change. The making of global environmental policy is framed not upon a hypothetical 
code of international law (there is no such a thing), but upon a body of doctrine arising from 
consistent reference to a given set of principles. The key principles are  sustainability (satisfying the 
need of present generations without preventing future generations to satisfy theirs), precaution 
(ignorance is not an excuse for inaction), the common but differentiated responsibility (developed 
countries take the lead in action against climate change), and economic efficiency (which lead to 
prefer flexible instruments over blind regulation). 
 
Given the scientific controversies and the fuzziness of guiding principles, no clear-cut demonstration 
could justify the choice of a theoretically optimum course of action, even in the short term. 
Historically, climate negotiations can be seen as an oscillation between two regulation modes. On 
one side is coordinated policies and measures, where countries adopt an uniform international rate of 
carbon tax. On the other side is emission trading, where a defined emission reduction target is 
allocated to each country.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The outlook of the international agenda has changed fundamentally over the past two decades. 
Global issues, such as nuclear hazards, acid rains, ozone hole and the greenhouse effect are now in 
the limelight, and the intrinsic characteristics of these invading issues create the conditions for 
increasing implementation difficulties: threshold effects, high degree of irreversibility, all 
pervasiveness, but essentially the radical uncertainty about the ecological mechanisms actually at 
work and even the reality of dangers.  
 
At the same time, the economic and industrial stakes associated with ecological issues have become 
more and more obvious. The environment is no longer only an externality that the welfare-state 
forces agents to integrate in the name of collective interest, and has become more a part and parcel of 
technological, industrial and economic strategies. Let us only mention here the demise of civil 
nuclear programs in several countries, the global ban on ozone-depleting substances, the use of 
environmental norms as protectionist tools, the comparative advantages between competing energy 
sources triggered by the greenhouse effect debate.  
 
This topic paper examines system management and policy framework for the climate change issue 
using three different points of view. We first start from a general picture of the way environmental 
policies happen when they have to be framed before scientific controversies can be resolved. In the 
second section, we examine the normative principles of intergenerational equity, precaution, 
international solidarity and efficiency. We finally go back to a descriptive stance with the third 
section on the history of climate negotiations. 
 
2. Controversial environmental issues and public decision 
 
2.1. Uncertainties and sequential policymaking  
 
The specifics of global environment issues stem from the fact that policy-making "runs ahead" of the 
scientific knowledge needed to inform that policy making because of both the inertia of "natural 
machine" and the economic and technological dynamics. Waiting for uncertainty to resolve (the 
policy of doing nothing) is also a choice. 
 
However, the view that scientific uncertainties alone are important and that they will resolve 
naturally with time would be naive, as we will discuss in this section. In the debates about the 
magnitude of global environment change and about the costs of coping with it, uncertainties about 
innovation trends, consumption patterns, land use and economic structural change are everywhere.  
 
The problem of decision-making under uncertainty is usually framed in terms of expected utility 
maximization given a set of possible but unknown "states of nature", a set of feasible acts and a set 
of impacts (see Decision Making and Policy Frameworks for Addressing Climate Change). That 
classical model meets its limits when it comes to emphasize the formation of bifurcations 
(irreversible or quasi-irreversible trends) in technology because of lock-in effects, in consumption 
patterns (connection between urban planning and transportation patterns), and in land-use patterns. 
Moreover, alternative possible baselines in development patterns are ex-ante available, with very 
contrasted long term impacts and the switch between the one or other of these baselines being made 
for reasons unrelated to environmental policies. 
 
An example of this uncertainty feature arises when debating the nuclear versus fossil fuel ecological 
controversy. This relates strongly to such issues as the dangers of the enhanced greenhouse effect, 
the overall limits to thermal pollution, and the possibility of another large nuclear accident. Besides 
the lack of scientific certainty that characterizes each of these matters, risks which are immeasurable 
by nature now have to be taken into account. 
 
After the limitations of the expected utility concept, there is the issue of the multiplicity of actors. 
Concerns about global environment issues do not result from a learning process where agents have a 
direct experience of a nuisance; the risk perception is determined by the way the warnings from 
scientific community are conveyed to public opinion and policy-makers by mass media. This is 
complicated by the earth sciences not being able to provide definitive answers about the incurred 
risks, by engineering sciences being uncertain about the potential of competing technologies and by 
ethical debates about the burden sharing. 
 
The result of any negotiation process depends, consequently, on the power of conviction of the 
defender of each technical (nuclear energy, biofuels) or institutional project (taxes, tradable permit 
system, standards) and of its capacity to mobilize controversies in technical fields, economics or 
ethics. Uncertainty becomes a strategic space for actors. Then, because of the fear of some forms of a 
dictatorship over the short term, in the name of the long term, resulting from arbitrary technological 
or economic policies, the trap to be avoided is to be paralyzed by never-ending controversies 
impeding a minimum consensus for action. 
 
In this context, the evaluation of environment policies, which requires the use of complicated 
Integrated Assessment models, aims not only at conveying information to policy-makers about the 
actual feedbacks between economy, environment and human welfare. It also aims at coordinating the 
expectations of agents having various worldviews grounded in various interpretation of scientific 
knowledge and ethic judgments. 
 
These Integrated Assessment models are, or should, be both knowledge tools and a negotiation 
language for actors (see Economics of Potential Climate Change and Integrated Assessment of 
Policy Instruments to Combat Climate Change): clarification of what is really at stake, coherence 
analysis of the implicit assumptions behind arguments, description of unexpected consequences of a 
given policy. The methodological issue is then to define such a language when the looseness of 
parameters is too high and when some of them are too influential on the results. 
 
Related to this objective, the difficulties of carrying out an agreed cost-benefit balance of climate 
policies (or any multi-criteria analysis) are easy to point out. Both the avoided costs of 
environmental change and the greenhouse gases abatement costs are uncertain. To cite a few critical 
parameters: energy prices and demand in baseline scenarios, timing of penetration of backstop 
technologies, transaction costs for removing the barriers to negative costs potentials, side-effects of 
recycling ecotaxes revenues. 
 
Fortunately, the precautionary principle recognizes the necessity to act without waiting for an 
agreement about controversial long-term parameters. For both scientific and political reasons, it is 
necessary to launch a sequential decision process instead of searching for a once and for all 
optimized policy. From a normative point of view, this framing points out the economic value of 
short term quantitatively limited actions in terms of option value (preventing the bifurcation risks) 
and information value: to curb down GHGs emissions today provides, for example, more time for 
getting a better scientific knowledge and drawing benefits from technical innovation. From the 
decision-making point of view, the aim is no longer to search for optimal decisions, but decisions 
taken "on time": in many cases, the real trade-off is between the costs of premature action and the 
risks of postponed action. 
 
In terms of procedural efficiency, a sequential decision-making process focuses on the search for 
first step agreements between actors who do not share the same vision of the long term and value 
judgments on the burden sharing. This is the context in which concepts such as "no-regret", "double-
dividend", "joint-product" of global environment policies make sense. In practice, an efficient 
integrated assessment should help in reconciling the kinetics of ecological hazards, of scientific 
knowledge, of technical change, of environmental concerns and of political cycles. 
 
2.2. Public decision from policy optimization to controversies management 
 
In the context of controversial environmental issues, political stakes may create the need for a 
decision to be made under emergency conditions. When it takes too much time for science to explain 
phenomena, the only means to solve a crisis lies in a socio-technical solution based on existing 
technologies, that is capable of reconciling political and economic interests involved in the debate on 
the environment. The emergency which necessitates taking decisions in the context of environmental 
and political crisis constrains both the rhythm and contents of choices.  
 
The European acid rain pollution illustrates that aspect of the public policy decision process under 
controversies. In this case, regulations (engine emissions norms implying the use of catalytic exhaust 
pipes and fuel injection) were decided hurriedly in order to solve an environmental issue (declining 
forests health) without the background of any scientific well-established knowledge. Long after the 
decisions, the scientific community is not yet really able to provide a satisfactory model of the 
phenomenon to the economic and political decision-makers. 
 
As a matter of fact, most scientists have given up all unilateral explanations and consider multi-
factorial approaches. The causes currently studied include permanent sources such as soil acidity due 
to atmospheric pollutants (usually called acid rain even if it includes dry deposits), acid fog (for its 
direct action on leaves and needles), photo-oxidation (PAN and ozone due to the anthropogenic 
emissions of NOx and volatile organic compounds), and some exceptional climatic events, such as 
the delayed effects of the 1976 drought, or the high temperatures of the 1983 summer. Finally some 
scientists put into question the  consequences of some forestry practices (especially spruce 
monoculture). 
 
The short decision time-scale prevents a following of the classic "positivist" way that goes from 
fundamental knowledge to applied research and implementation of the innovation. Technical 
solutions to environmental crises have always to be found in the available existing technologies 
inevitably related to the "trumps" prepared long beforehand. 
 
Moreover, "clean technologies" considered here are not part of the classic categories of innovation: 
innovations significantly lowering the costs of an existing service or inventing a new service 
disclosing a new demand. Actually, production costs are increased a priori by ecologically sound 
innovations, which do not bring any new real benefit to the private consumer. Consequently, the 
producer cannot reasonably expect to find self-maintained markets for getting rid of pollution or 
ecologically-sound technologies without betting on national or international regulations likely to 
occur. 
 
Therefore, from the standpoint of the industry, the problem is not ecological but the inverted, 
economic risk. The inverted risk can be defined as a situation in which the industrial risk generated 
by the controversial solution to the environmental crisis surpasses the ecological danger. In other 
words, the producer has to take into account a new environmental cost category; it is neither the 
ecological costs nor the  costs of getting rid of pollution that are usually discussed in literature, but 
more fundamentally a strategic revision cost, i.e., the cost of redefining part or the entire industrial 
strategy: re-orienting the "three-liters-car" innovation strategy and adjusting to the catalytic exhaust 
pipe constraint, converting quickly to unleaded gasoline and setting up of a double oil-distribution 
network, totally freezing the nuclear program in case of another accident, etc. 
 
Since the innovation policy of industrial groups is generally led by criteria, which are quite different 
from environmental efficiency, their "normal" behavior will be: 
* to try negotiating a framework of new rules which minimizes the adjustment costs; 
* to exclude any answer requiring solutions going beyond existing state of the art technology, 
* to build, on the basis of the present state of knowledge, an argument capable of scientifically 
legitimating this position; with the risk that the implicit prophecy supporting this argumentation 
turns to be defeated either because of the eruption of real environment problems, or because of 
politically more convincing images produced by competitors. 
 
This suggests that there may be no rational process that would allow the ending of a negotiation to be 
ecologically efficient. It also suggests that the worse case to be avoided may be the generalization of 
out-of-control disputes on the inverted risk, disregarding the environmental issue. 
 
On the whole, in a context of scientific uncertainty, the environmental issue is apparently becoming 
used as an argument for quite independent industrial or energy strategies. This instrumentalization is, 
in fact, linked to the "mediatization" of the environmental crisis that leads decision-makers to be 
argumentative towards both public opinion and the political sphere, and to the necessity for each 
actor to rely, in the short term, on the existing available technologies.  
 
To be brief, the sequence can be interpreted as follows: 
1. The environmental issue is highlighted by scientists. Scientific uncertainty leads to controversy. 
2. Mediatization: the environmental crisis is a communication issue related to major social stakes. 
Mediatization of the incomplete information relative to major ecological risk results both in a 
mobilization of public opinion on these topics and, consequently, in alerting the political sphere. 
3. Instrumentalization: the environment is integrated as a marketing argument in industrial strategies.  
4. Then, there is an environment-specific innovation process. 
 
Each phase of this sequence is played with a different tempo. Actually, as long as an environmental 
problem may be considered as securing a certain amount of time to prepare answers, this delay may 
favor self-comforting attitudes, which will lead to hasty reactions when a crisis draws near. The 
mediatization process dictates its own political rhythm, driven by short-term considerations. 
 
The attempt at avoiding this mediatization-instrumentalization process would, probably, be irrelevant 
because this would imply the possibility of a legitimate substantive rationality, the absence of which 
is actually highlighted by the crisis itself. But it may be interesting to try to escape from the crisis 
temporality dictated by this process in order to avoid too hasty choices that would leave no time for 
developing alternative technological projects. The stake here is the one of the regulation of 
contradictory anticipations of what is the common good and to avoid a too hasty closing of the 
controversies. 
 
2.3. Summarizing the Policy Framework 
 
In environmental issues, such as the acid rain issue or climate change, the structure of relationships 
between economy, ecology and society share three important defining characteristics, namely 
controversies, mediatization and the need for innovation. 
 
* Controversies: The present and future "states of the world" are not only largely random and 
uncertain, but also controversial. Randomness and uncertainty are linked to the idea of a learning 
process bringing additional information and have been dealt with through the concept of option 
value. In the configuration of "decision under controversy", several scientific theories are competing 
for describing the possible states of the world and the assessment of the probability distribution. The 
key point of this group process is that decisions must be taken before the scientific closing of these 
controversies.  
 
* Mediatization: the agents preferences for environment are no more linked to a direct perception of 
a state of nature, but rather are the result of a mediatization process in which experts from the 
scientific community are involved. For example, the level of concern about acid rain was very low in 
Western Germany and the mediatization model better explains the timing of the reactions than does 
the real evolution of the phenomena, which is very slow. The history of the acid rain concern is in 
fact an archetype of a new range of problems: people living near a motorway often protest against 
the noise and impose protection walls, but nobody would complain about ozone layer depletion or 
greenhouse effect, without the warning of some scientists and the activity of journalists and 
politicians. 
 
* Need for innovation: The problem at stake is less about internalizing the external costs with a 
given technical tool-box by addition of de-pollution units, than about playing on the innovation 
process. 
 
As no industrial commitment can be taken without a certain stabilization of the decision context 
(norms, laws, economic instruments), and because this stabilization cannot be achieved without a 
minimum collective agreement on the controversies, there is a collective pressure to reduce this 
instability and to converge on a subset of theories able to legitimate a minimum agreement. 
 
The competition between scientific theories is then part and parcel of the strategy of each economic 
actor. Actors look forward to a situation in which the agreement is made on the theory, which 
maximizes their strategic advantages. The environment becomes a parameter of the industrial 
strategy with no guarantee that the common agreement be ecologically founded. 
 
Based on these reasons, the reflection on the optimum institutional process for dealing with the 
economy/ecology interface cannot only be focused downstream, assuming a well-shaped  
distribution of costs and benefits and a straightforward determination of the cause/effect 
relationships. Cost-benefit analysis has difficulty in founding collective action when the costs and 
benefits remain unknown and controversial throughout the decision process.  
 
The institutional context partly determines the cognitive process, and at least the state of suspension 
of controversies within a scientifically non-achieved cognitive process, which will permit the 
beginning of the collective action. 
 
3. Principles for managing global commons 
 
In the case of climate change, the institutional context is the United Nations. Formally, this is the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and Conference of Parties. 
From a more general point of view, the global environmental policy is framed not upon a 
hypothetical code of international law (there is no such a thing), but upon a body of doctrine arising 
from consistent reference to a given set of principles. 
 
In this section, we examine four key principles explicitly recognized in the UN FCCC, namely: 
sustainability, precaution, the common but differentiated responsibility, and economic efficiency. 
 
3.1. Intergenerational solidarity and timely action 
 
Sustainability, broadly defined as meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs, has many interpretations. Developing countries stress 
the right for sustainable development goes much beyond the preservation of natural resources. In this 
section, we will focus on an important aspect of the sustainability debate: the question of inertia and 
climate policy timing. 
 
Let us temporarily adopt the usual deterministic decision-making framework. This is equivalent to 
assuming that we are certain of what constitutes the stabilization level of a greenhouse gas that 
prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. In a deterministic setting, 
discounting, inertia of economic systems and technical change justify that early abatement may be 
proved less cost effective than abatements postponed to further time periods, at least for targets 
above 550 parts per million in volume (ppmv). 
 
Climate policies will have consequences for both the present and future generations, and any 
decision comes practically to a form of implicit or explicit weighting of the value of events occurring 
at different points in time. Economic analyzes try and make this weighting explicit by using a 
discounted utility function for comparing different inter-temporal welfare distributions. This makes 
the welfare losses of given abatement costs lower in the future, and, consequently, a higher discount 
rate makes postponing action more attractive. This raises the question of the appropriate level of the 
discount rate (see Equity, Economic Discounting, and Cost-Benefit Assessments). 
 
Socio-economic systems are clearly characterized by important inertia in the sense that rapid 
changes of their evolution require far larger amount of efforts than smooth adaptations. Recent 
debates on economic and social inertia have extended beyond the question of physical capital stock 
turnover, which spans from 5 to 50 years, depending upon the type of equipment considered. They 
led to the idea that part of the emissions dynamics is determined by parameters beyond the energy 
sector and whose inertia may be far higher. Mark Jaccard portrays the great diversity of the sources 
of inertia using a three level hierarchy of the decisions governing the dynamics of emissions and 
energy demand: 
* The end use equipment: For the selection of equipment using energy in a more or less efficient 
way, decisions are made by private agents and the turnover of capital stock ranges from a few years 
to two decades. At this level, the relative cost of delivering a given energy service is the key criteria 
within informational constraints and market imperfections inhibiting the access to the best available 
technologies. 
* The infrastructure and industrial equipments: This level is largely governed by centralized public 
and/or private decision-makers. It encompasses the buildings, the major transit modes, and industrial 
infrastructure. The turnover of capital stocks is measured in decades and every decision involves an 
amount of capital whose magnitude is far higher than that at the end-use level. Except in some 
energy intensive activities, energy costs are a minor decision parameter compared with, for example, 
strategic criteria in the industry or cost/speed ratio in the transportation sector. 
* Land-use and urban planning: This level is driven by infrastructure decisions and by public 
policies which can either be explicit, i.e., urban planning, incentives to an even distribution of the 
human settlements, or implicit, i.e., subsidies to mobility, or rules governing tenants and landlords 
relationships. It greatly determines the growth of transportation needs and the related demand for 
fuels. 
 
Beyond the turnover of capital stocks, inertia in the economic system results from the interactions 
between these three levels. Final energy demand is driven not only by the efficiency of the end-use 
equipment but also by structural changes in the production sectors (share of energy intensive 
industries or as just-in-time production processes) and by evolutions in life styles and in the 
geographic distribution of human settlements. 
 
For example, the very architecture of the buildings determines the air conditioning requirements; 
urban forms determine not only the transportation needs but also the relative proportion of travel 
made on foot, on bicycles, by rail or by private car. The attraction of activities around the proximity 
of infrastructures, the induced investment, the nature of skills and the amount of embedded interests 
generate dynamics that are hard to curve overnight.  
 
Most economic analysts pointed out the fact that accelerating the turnover of capital stocks would 
imply higher costs of climate policies because the costs of premature retirement of existing capital 
stocks are to be covered, in addition to the costs of abatement techniques. 
 
Inertia also has an opposite effect: the more important is the inertia (it is reasonable to anticipate that 
reforming the energy systems will take at least 50 years), the sooner one has to start. This is why the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that: "The choice of abatement paths 
involves balancing the economic risks of rapid abatement now (that premature capital stock 
retirement will later be proven unnecessary), against the corresponding risks of delay (that more 
rapid reduction will then be required, necessitating premature retirement of future capital)". 
 
The balance between both these effects is a matter of empirical evaluation, but in a certainty case it 
could be argued that, given a 550 ppmv target for atmospheric CO2 concentration, the balance might 
not be that biased in favor of early abatement. 
 
3.2. The precautionary principle 
 
Reasoning in a certainty case ignores the fact that we are not likely to know in the near future at what 
concentration level dangerous interferences with the climate system would occur, which is the FCCC 
objective adopted at Rio in 1992. The precautionary principle states that, when there is a danger of 
large or irreversible damage, ignorance is not a motive for inaction. In this section, we will first 
examine some potentially large damages, before discussing more in detail the effects of 
irreversibilities. 
 
Beyond scientific uncertainties on climate dynamics, uncertainties endogenous to human behavior 
may also influence the timing of action. Sudden changes in public concern should be anticipated for 
many reasons. Past experience demonstrates that political life cycles of environmental issues is not 
only driven by scientific discoveries or symptomatic events, but also by the necessary maturation of 
the public acceptance of new risks, by possible mismanagement of information, (e.g., the``mad cow'' 
crisis) or by the combination of political parameters as illustrated by the European acid rain/forest 
dieback crisis example. 
 
This is why IPCC also states that\ “the challenge is not to find the best policy today for the next 100 
years, but to select a prudent strategy and to adjust it over time in the light of new information''. To 
fully recognize this statement's meaning, however, one has to consider that uncertainty is not only 
limited to the impacts of climate change, but also pertains to the economics of reducing emissions. 
 
Uncertainties about the baseline socio-economic future are as large as uncertainties about the climate 
system, and this is all the more dangerous as the underlying technical systems are rigid. In the 
transportation sector, the loop between demand and supply patterns is so high that inertia may lead to 
a lock in carbon intensive development patterns. Experience demonstrates that progress in the 
efficiency of oil-based motors has been largely offset by rebound effects such as higher driven 
distances; bigger cars and increased competitiveness of road compared to rail and waterways 
transportation. This can significantly delay the market penetration of low- and zero-carbon transport 
technologies (see CO2 mitigation and adaptation measures). 
 
Evolutions in energy demand and technology are intrinsically uncertain. Most of the baselines 
retained in recent forecasting studies incorporate expectations of stable or steadily increasing energy 
prices over the following decades. These are not, however, fully supported by recent analysis of 
structural determinants of oil prices, which underlines in particular the drastic decrease of the cost of 
new discoveries. Moreover, they do not capture possible bifurcations in trends in the transportation 
sector over the long run, which are conditional upon today's infrastructure decisions. 
 
To some extent, technical change on carbon saving techniques supports the idea of belated GHG 
abatements. If, thanks to invention and adoption of technical innovation, costs of these techniques 
decrease along with time, then technical progress concurs with discounting: it decreases the relative 
cost of future efforts. 
 
The fact that most available modeling tools capture this process through an autonomous technical 
change coefficient may, however, reinforce the common misperception that carbon saving technical 
change is a “Manna from Heaven” whose quantity steadily grows over time. Considering more 
realistically the fact that technical progress is yielded by investments in research and development 
leads to a different view because it focuses on the timing of required policy signals. 
 
This is why the logical distinction between the timing of abatement and the timing of action must be 
emphasized. Abatement implies investments within a given technical endowment. Policy action, 
such as a carbon tax aiming primarily to induce low-cost alternatives in the future, is much more 
comprehensive. 
 
The combination of the irreversibility of CO2 build-up with unexpected bad news from climate 
science could lead to a sudden acceleration of adaptation and mitigation policies to compensate a 
delay in abatement efforts. Stabilization of CO2 concentration at 400 ppmv has already become a 
goal difficult to defend in a full cost-benefit analysis (although it can be noted that there exist several 
consistent global energy scenarios to this target). It will be the same for 450 ppmv in a couple of 
decades if present emissions trends continue. 
 
The precautionary policy approach explicitly balances the environmental irreversibility: that 
increasing the stock of pollutant today implies more effort tomorrow, and the investment 
irreversibility, i.e., the opportunity cost of over-cautious policies. The first and most robust insight of 
the analysis is that the critical factor is adjustment costs under the worst-case hypothesis. If the target 
is 550 ppmv, then differing action until 2010 has only a modest effect upon the optimal cost profile, 
but if the target is 450 ppmv there is a very high supplementary cost to waiting. 
 
There is a “window of opportunity” for any concentration target. Out of this window of opportunity, 
we would then face the dilemma of choosing between economically disruptive policy measures or 
facing climatic changes which are today viewed as unacceptable. An earlier mitigation action may 
increase the flexibility in moving toward stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse 
gases. 
The reverse is also true. It is still arguable that, ultimately, damages due to climate change will be 
proven negligible even for an average temperature increase well over 2oC. Then, symmetrically to 
the environmental irreversibility effect, an investment and technical irreversibility effect has to be 
considered which sets a brake to climate change mitigation policies. It implies that waiting for more 
information will avoid the risk of over-protecting the environment. 
 
The balance of these two opposed irreversibility effects is still an unsettled issue. Conclusions may 
depend significantly on ideas about technical change. If indeed, instead of being viewed as 
autonomous or induced in a very flexible manner by public policies, technical change is treated as an 
autocatalytic process of learning-by-doing, economies of scale, informational increasing returns and 
positive network externalities, then it can induce bifurcations and lock-in processes. 
 
Beyond a critical point, market forces indeed tend to reinforce the first choice in a self-fulfilling 
process instead of correcting it. Seen from 1998, there are several possible market equilibria in 2020, 
and several possible states of the world characterized by different technical contents. The bifurcation 
towards one or another depends upon the early decisions made today and on the present 
expectations. 
 
For example, we can easily distinguish two very different equilibria in the transportation sector with 
relatively similar total costs, but very different carbon contents: they can't be discriminated today, 
but the costs of shifting from the adopted one to the other in the future might be all the more 
important when the transition period is short. In such a setting, the technical irreversibility effect 
may be higher than generally expected in literature. 
 
Another important component of the option value in the context of global environmental risks has 
been named ‘dependent-learning’ by economists A. C. Fisher and W. M. Hanemann. To quote them, 
it surely requires no algebra to show that, if the information about the consequences of an 
irreversible development action can be obtained only by undertaking development, this strengthens 
the case for some development. In other words, at the beach one can't taste the water without wetting 
one's feet. 
 
Here again one has to consider symmetrically this effect on the environmental side and on the 
technological side. Less CO2 emissions would slow the rise of the climate change ‘signal’ over the 
climatic natural variability ‘noise’. This effect, which supports the idea of more emissions over the 
short run, may actually be very small. According to Prof. B. Bolin, former chairman of the IPCC, 
implementing the Kyoto Protocol would only make a difference of 1 or 1.5 ppmv for the CO2 
concentration in 2010. That is to be compared with the about 120 ppmv increase over the pre-
industrial level. 
 
Conversely, emission control policies are likely to bring significant scientific, technical and 
institutional learning. This is why, in the case of climate change, we argue that the dependent 
learning effect is far higher on the technology-side. This is an argument for earlier decisions which 
may not have received full attention in climate policy models to date. 
 
3.3. The common but differentiated responsibility 
 
The common but differentiated responsibility states that developing countries should take the lead in 
action. One of the likely deadlocks of climate policies is that, under the dominant interpretation of 
the Kyoto framework, the rules governing the quota allocation beyond 2012 have to be clarified for 
embarking developing countries in climate policies. "Until the question of emission rights and 
entitlements is addressed equitably, it [will] not be possible to have emission trading". This request 
by the G77 expresses both the concern of developing countries to be excluded from the new 
technological markets provisioned in the Kyoto protocol and the impossibility for them to commit to 
binding emission limits without prior clarification of the rules of the game. In this section, we 
discuss the burden sharing issue. 
 
Those who expect that the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) will get round the allocation 
problem should remember this blunt statement by the "father" of the concept Estrada-Oyuela, in 
1998: "Though I facilitated approval of this proposal, I did not like it. My reservation was that the 
CDM is considered as a form of joint implementation but I do not understand how commitments can 
be implemented jointly if only one Party involved is committed to limit or reduce emissions and the 
other Party is free from the quantitative point of view". This problem can become serious if baselines 
from individual CDM projects are set without regard to the total emissions of greenhouse gas in the 
country where the project is located.  
 
Beyond this North-South divide, the entitlement problem also underpins the "supplementary 
condition to the use of flexibility mechanisms" requested by the EU. This condition expresses, 
indeed, the concern that countries using these mechanisms to escape domestic efforts may be 
embarked on carbon intensive pathways and will not accept ambitious targets for the next budget 
period. This dynamic inconsistency problem can be resolved only through target setting rules, which 
preserves the environmental integrity of the framework. 
 
In such a context, the recommendation by the IPCC Second Assessment Report that "equity and 
efficiency should be separated", however wise it is, is hardly operational. Indeed, allocating 
emissions quotas amongst countries inevitably leads to questioning the linkages between equity and 
efficiency. 
 
Negotiating burden sharing rules in the real world confronts evidently with the non- observability 
and the uncertainty of some critical parameters. Hence, the operational necessity of simple rules 
relying on observable parameters: population, wealth, or energy use. Many of these rules have been 
proposed in literature. None of them has an economic legitimacy per se and none even pretend to be 
a proxy of the first best economic rules. They translate a mix of political judgments, but they will not 
be apt to support an agreement over the long run if they lead to an outcome that will be viewed as 
too costly and unfair by some parties. 
 
The obvious start is to examine per-capita figures using the present situation. 
 
Table 1 presents the allocation of a total 10 billion dollars bill among countries on the basis of the 
per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) allocation rule. This rule is that the burden is shared 
proportionally to wealth. The reference year is 1997. We come to the fact that both individual 
expenses and total national expenses are strongly differentiated among countries. Following this rule, 
each North American should pay $10.3 for climate against only 15 cents for each Indian (a 71 to 1 
ratio), each European should pay $7.6 (a 52 to 1 ratio with India), and each Chinese only 26 cents (a 
1.8 to 1 ratio). Globally, OECD countries do contribute to nearly four fifths of the overall effort. 
 
Table 1. International allocation of a 10 billion dollar climate burden proportionally to per capita 
GDP. 
 
Even if climate expenses are built on the basis of purchasing power parity GDP (figures not shown 
in this paper), the discrepancies between countries remain wide. With this new basis, each American 
pays $8.2 (17 times more than each Indian), and each European $5.7 (a 12 against 1 ratio). OECD 
still contributes to three fifths of the overall effort. 
 
It is important to note here that, although it is based on an allocation of weights in the inter-temporal 
utility function proportional to wealth, the allocation rule we obtain here is a good translation of the 
common but differentiated responsibility of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Had 
we used a more equitable weight distribution, for instance by giving each agent the same weight, we 
would have obtained a costs distribution in which the richest region would finance the integrality of 
the public good, which might not be the most efficient. 
 
Beyond today's per-capita figures, it is critical to consider trends and expectations when it comes to 
regulating the growth of CO2 emissions.  
 
Some empirical results lead to the idea that in the richest countries, demographic increase is more 
critical than the increase in per capita GNP. The intuition behind this result is that per capita growth 
consists mostly of dematerialized services that embed little greenhouse gas emissions. The idea is 
also supported by the fact that only population increase can explain the emission growth in the 
poorest countries, which had negative growth per capita over the period from 1985 to 1995. 
 
The link is less appealing for other areas of the world that are industrializing. Figure 1 shows that 
population growth and emission growth are positively correlated, although countries which are 
experiencing large structural change in the economy are well away from stabilization per capita - in 
both directions. 
 
Figure 1. Emissions trends vs. population trends, 1990-1996. Average population growth rate (source 
World Bank) versus fossil fuel CO2 emissions variation rate (source WEC). In 1996, fossil CO2 
emissions were: World: 6.51, USA: 1.75, EU 15: 0.96, China: 0.83, India: 0.22 GtC. 
 
Demographics helps to explain part of the divergence between Europe and US initial propositions for 
Kyoto. The US Bureau of the Census foresees one hundred million new inhabitants in the United 
States between 1996 and 2038, with a 32 million increase by 2010. To date, the debate has mainly 
focused on per country rather than per capita emissions, hiding the consequences of this particular 
population effect. 
 
At current per capita emission levels, these 32 million US inhabitants correspond CO2-wise to 271 
million Chinese, 770 million Indians or 75 million Europeans. Even assuming annual variation rates 
of per capita emissions of -1% in the US and +4% in developing countries, these figures remain 
impressive: the additional population in the US emits as much as 142 million Chinese or 406 million 
Indians. 
 
It helps to explains why -15% seems unrealistic and unachievable in America while technically 
feasible and economically manageable in Europe, even if static economic reasoning would suggest 
the opposite: given the higher per capita emissions levels, many low cost reduction opportunities that 
have been already exploited in Europe may still be available in America. 
 
After per-capita figures, we will explore a convergence scheme. 
 
The hot issue of the climate negotiations is the entry of non-annex I countries within a binding 
agreement. Per capita convergence is possibly one way to involve non annex I countries in an 
eventual emission market without constraining them. We consider here short-term implications of 
convergence. A convergence goal is defined by the date at which per capita emissions are supposed 
to converge, and the level of the common target. We explored targets in 2100 or 2050, at levels 
going from 0.5 to 1.5 tC per person per year. 
 
Table 2 uses the projected population and the prescribed quota per head to derive the 2010 global 
and regional emission quotas. Results are in the same units as targets defined in Kyoto: CO2 
reductions relative to the base year 1990. 
 
Table 2. Implications for 2010 of a normative per capita linear convergence of fossil CO2 emissions. 
 
Looking first at the global level, it is noticeable that in 2010, the goal 1.5 tC in 2050 is broadly 
consistent with the central no action IPCC scenario IS92a: +42% emissions. This would make it 
difficult afterwards to stabilize the atmospheric CO2 concentration at a level of 550 ppmv (a level 
corresponding to the doubling of pre-industrial concentration, and over which the temperature 
increase could be judged dangerous). 
 
Due to its softer slope of decreasing emissions per head, Western Europe has a prescribed target of -
10%, while the USA are pressed to -15%. However, the USA are protected in the sense that future 
population increases grants this country more emission rights and compensates the higher rate of per 
capita decrease implied by convergence. All other Annex I countries stand in between. The short 
horizon puts the USA under a stronger pressure, and the longer run horizon favors the USA much 
more than countries with lower population dynamics (Central and Eastern Europe). The Western 
Europe quota in 2010 is more dependent on the target range at both horizons. 
 
Keeping the 1tC convergence target at both horizons (2050, 2100) we now turn to non Annex 1 
countries: is the per capita convergence principle consistent with their growth needs? Possible quotas 
have to be compared with how much emissions are expected under different business as usual 
hypotheses. Such a criterion favors low 1990 emitters per head: South Asia and Sub Saharan Africa. 
Others might be neutral (Middle East and North Africa) or slightly favorable to the 2050 horizon.  
 
However in the case of (1tC, 2050) the 2010 index of +58% for China and +64% for Latin America 
is not up to their economic growth expectations. Chinese  emissions in 1996 were already 30% 
above these in 1990. Paradoxically, the relatively slower demography of China up to 2010 (+27%) is 
putting at risk its favor to such a purely per capita criterion which would not take account of past 
ecological debts of Annex I countries. 
 
3.4. Efficiency 
 
In modern economics, global environmental risk is often considered as a classic problem of the 
"public good". This means that a private activity (the legal ownership does not matter here) is 
implicitly allowed to "use" the environment, i.e., to take the risk of affecting the quality of public 
goods; this can be expressed in theoretical terms as the attribution of "primary property rights". 
Market economy operates when these rights are defined and ascertained; when new standards are 
enacted for the environment or other fields, these rights are really redistributed. This redistribution 
results in an institutional process including the administrative, juridicial and political spheres at 
various levels from local to international authorities. Firms, local and national authorities, as well as 
groups of citizens can be affected. 
 
Theoretically, the allocative dimension and the distribution of both costs and benefits should be 
considered. Appendix 1 discusses the fundamental difference between cost-benefit versus cost-
efficiency analysis in more detail (see Equity, Economic Discounting and Cost Benefit Assessment). 
However, during the following decade, the focus might remain on how to minimize the costs of 
meeting the Kyoto targets. This is why in practice, the dominant negotiation language will probably 
remain only in terms of cost. 
 
However, the word "cost" is not without confusion in itself (see Generic Assessment and Costs of 
Response Strategies). This is because the concept of cost applies to four scales in the social system: 
1. At the scale of the plant or the household good, technical costs for alternative energy saving 
technologies can be known with confidence, in an engineering perspective. This corresponds, for 
example, to the difference in cost between an electric vehicle and a conventional gasoline-powered 
one. 
2. At the scale of a given industry in a given region, sectoral costs associated with alternative 
regulation programs can be computed. An example of this would be the costs to the electricity 
industry as a whole to cap CO2 emissions at its 1990 levels. 
3. Economy-wide, costs have to account for inter-sectoral and general equilibrium effects. For 
example, when analyzing stricter thermal insulation norms in commercial buildings, one has to 
account not only for the cost to the landowners, but also for the extra activity in the building sector. 
4. Finally, social costs go beyond the economy to encompass other welfare objectives, such as 
employment or health. These are very difficult to define and measure precisely. However, these kind 
of costs cannot be ignored. 
 
This distinction in scales allows the clarification of policy debates on the no-regret policies. These 
are defined as the measures that will not be regretted if, ultimately, anthropogenic climate change is 
proved to be harmless. There is no rigorous definition of the no-regret concept and it will suffice, for 
the following discussion, to note that a "no-regret" strategy is possible only if the current state of 
economy is assumed to be located somewhere below the theoretical production frontier between 
conventional goods and the quality of environment. 
 
First centered on the efficiency gap due to market imperfections in the energy sector (the so-called 
bottom-up and top-down debate), discussions about no-regret were extended to the environmental 
double-dividend expected from the side-effects of GHGs reductions on other environmental issues 
and from the economic double-dividend from carbon taxes.  
 
Environmental double dividends are also known as "ancillary benefits" of climate policy. The issue 
with naming reflects the complexity of the underlying question: policymakers target several 
objectives at the same time and each choice has implications for all of those. In other words, 
everything depends on everything. 
 
Still, research to date finds, rather consistently, that the result that reducing global pollution tends 
also to bring local air quality benefits, but the opposite is not true: local air quality improvement 
measures may use more energy, and therefore may lead to an increase in global CO2 emissions. 
 
The above discussion about the meaning of 'cost' should not be taken as a tree hiding the forest. Even 
if there can be only very crude estimates of the costs, an order of magnitude estimate is basically all 
what policymaking needs. An assessment of short-term economic consequences of various long-term 
CO2 concentration ceilings is possible: 
 
Setting such a ceiling at 650 ppmv is consistent with global CO2 emissions averaging around 10 
Gigatons of Carbon (GtC) per year during the next century. Given that current emission level is 
around 7 GtC (more or less 1GtC), there is no sense of urgency for this target. 
 
Achieving 450 ppmv is consistent with an average carbon budget of about 6.5 GtC per year during 
the next century. This is less than the actual emissions for the year 2000. Given the previous 
discussion of inertia, little additional explanation is needed to understand that immediate action is 
required to ensure compatibility between this target and future demographic and economic growth. 
 
The numbers above suggest that an ultimate objective for atmospheric CO2 concentration in the 
range of 450 to 650 ppmv makes economic sense. To set a more precise objective seems difficult. 
For example, the target of two times the pre-industrial CO2 concentration level retained by the EU 
before Kyoto to support its position, and which is governed at least implicitly many thought-
experiments, refers to a CO2-equivalent level of 550 ppmv. Experts generally agree that the target 
550 ppmv does not adequately qualify the ultimate UNFCCC policy objective for various reasons: 
* Ambiguity: accounting for other greenhouse gases, the target could be interpreted as referring to 
about 450 ppmv for the level of CO2 alone. It is also unclear whether 550 is more related to radiative 
forcing, which matters for climate dynamics, or to a two degree warming, temperature being a proxy 
for damages. 
* Atemporality: there are no serious policy targets without timetables. This is all the more important 
that the speed of climate change commands the variability of climate, and that increased intra-annual 
and regional climatic instability is directly related to the occurrence of extreme events in local 
ecosystems and economies. 
* Uncertainty: surprises are still possible regarding the concentration level and the pace at which 
global climatic non-linearities occur, leading to a revision of the ultimate objective.  
 
Modeling exercises suggest that the idea of a long run GHG concentration target apt to prevent 
dangerous interference with the climate system, as phrased by the Climate Convention, should be 
taken with caution. This is the reason why the IPCC Second Assessment Report strongly advocated 
that climate policies must be framed as a sequential process: one should not look forward to optimize 
the response over the long run, but one should try to find a flexible strategy apt to be modified in the 
light of new information regarding climate and technology. 
 
From a price point of view, models show that a carbon tax of about 50 to 100 dollars per ton could 
have a significant effect of the 10-20 years horizon. Existing carbon sequestration technologies are in 
the range of 100-200 dollars per ton. As we have seen above, the order of magnitude of carbon 
emissions per capita in a developed country is a few tons per year. Given the existing energy prices, 
such a tax would increase household energy bills significantly, but not to the point of doubling it. 
 
Theoretically, in an ideal economic world perspective, a carbon-tax should be set at an uniform rate 
across all countries, since it aims at giving to every agent the same "signal" about the potential costs 
of climate change (see What Do We Know about Carbon Taxes). In practice, one has to account for 
many pre-existing distortions in energy markets. 
 
Side-effects of an internally recycled ecotax were analyzed in great detail, some empirical macro-
economic studies mainly in the European context concluding to a positive double-dividend. Works 
from a theoretical perspective shed some doubts about the likeliness of such a double-dividend being 
apt to offset the gross costs of climate policies if all the general equilibrium effects of such a fiscal 
reform are accounted for. It is not the place here to enter into the details of this discussion, but it is 
uncontroversial that a double-dividend occurs when the marginal distortion of a carbon tax is lower 
that the distortion of taxes to which it is substituted. 
 
This introduces a second element of heterogeneity between countries' cost functions. Many European 
countries, for example, finance not only their public administration but also their health system, 
social security and teaching system by raising funds from taxes levied directly or indirectly on 
wages, which is suspected to be a cause of structural unemployment; the fiscal system is very 
different in the US and in Japan as a practical translation of different views of social organization. In 
the same way, the measurement of the distortionary effects of pre-existing energy taxes cannot be 
directly derived from their observed level: many oil importing countries indeed levy energy taxes to 
achieve public objectives, such as security, minimization of shocks of trade balance, funding of road 
infrastructure. 
 
The consequence is that the recycling of a carbon tax creates a wedge between the gross cost of 
GHGs abatement (the sum of the costs of abatement technologies) and the net cost for the economy; 
determinants of this wedge are country specific and are not apt to be homogenized through foreign 
trade. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol recognizes the limitations of tax-based mechanisms. Together with quantitative 
targets, the Protocol contains several provisions for the use of ‘flexibility mechanisms'. The most 
important facility is emissions trading (see Using Emissions Trading to Regulate Global GHG 
Emissions). A second flexibility mechanism is the banking-borrowing of emissions allowances. 
Third, compensations between pollutants is possible, since the target is on a basket of six gases. For 
example, methane emission cuts beyond the target levels could partially offset insufficient reductions 
in carbon dioxide emissions. 
 
To facilitate each country to keep within its emissions assignment, the Protocol also allows: 
emissions trading amongst developed countries, the joint implementation projects in developed 
countries and the Clean Development Mechanisms in developing countries. 
 
In addition, the existence of the so-called European Bubble leads to the possibility for other Annex B 
countries to create new `bubbles' within which they can renegotiate their assignments through a 
political deal between GHG emissions and other economical and political objectives.  
 
The risk of too high economic costs of a trading system can be limited by introducing an upper cap 
to the price of permits, also known as a safety valve. This can be done by ensuring an infinite supply 
of permits is available at the given cap price, for example $150/tC. 
 
The safety valve may facilitate the commitment to action. But the environmental efficiency of the 
system is not guaranteed under this system. There are two answers to that concern. First, a cap price 
will exist in practice even without an explicit safety valve. It will be the expected penalty for non-
compliance. This is because an economically rational agent would always choose to pay a fine of 
$150/tC instead of buying permits at $250/tC. Second, the policy objective should not consider only 
the environmental efficiency, but the total social cost that also includes the effects of abatement 
measures upon the economy. 
 
On the other hand, it is also possible to implement in the trading system a lower floor for the carbon 
price. This recent proposition may contribute to addressing concerns about effectiveness of a flexible 
emissions control system. In effect, doing both confines the market in a tunnel between the floor 
price and the ceiling price. Such a system would combine features of both price-based and quantity-
based instruments. 
 
Given the scientific controversies and the fuzziness of the guiding principles, no clear-cut 
demonstration could justify the choice of a theoretically optimum course of action, even in the short 
term. In the next section, we turn to a historical perspective to understand todays situation of the 
policy framework. 
 
4. Historical perspective on climate negotiations 
 
The history of climate negotiations can be seen as an oscillation between two regulation modes. On 
one side are coordinated policies and measures, where countries adopt a uniform international rate of 
carbon tax. On the other side is emission trading, where a defined emission reduction target is 
allocated to each country. In this section, we describe how negotiations arrived to the emissions 
trading system, and discuss its potential for the future. 
 
4.1. Before Rio: a quick start, then a failed EU initiative 
 
Let us come back to the emergence of the global warming issue on the international policy arena and 
the respective role of the US and the European countries in this affair. There is, indeed, no simple 
explanation of the reasons why the US administration put it on the table of the G7 meeting in 1988. 
 
Many parameters have played a role within the US political system: the pressure from ecologists 
movements, the public sensitivity to climate risks after the dramatic consequences of the 1987 and 
1988 summers in the middle-west, the activism of the epistemological community in favor of the 
energy efficiency who wanted to transform this emerging challenge into a new opportunity. This 
would probably never have resulted so quickly in such a consideration by top level officials without 
some more general concerns over the stability of oil markets and its geopolitical implications. 
Climate change was viewed by a part of the US administration as a possible tool for convincing the 
US public opinion to accept some form of internal policy in the energy field. 
 
Obviously, the geopolitical interest in the global warming issue changed drastically after the gulf 
crisis and the war against Iraq, and to a lesser extent after the fall in the costs of the discovery of new 
reserves. 
 
On the European side, the dominant reflex was to frame the response in terms of internationally 
coordinated tax. It appeared later that the governments of some big European countries, officially 
supportive of this proposal, were not really ready to confront the political difficulties of 
implementing it. North European countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Netherlands) adopted small 
carbon or carbon energy taxes before Rio de Janeiro for domestic reasons, but also to have a 
demonstration effect and facilitate the adoption of a harmonized tax within the European Union.  
 
It is also certain that some of the departments of the European Commission, such as DG XI but also 
in part DG II, developed a strong argumentation in favor of a mixed carbon-energy tax. France, 
having officially rejected any form of quota approach, proposed a very high carbon tax (around 166 
European currency units) and Germany having claimed its will to support an increase of the fiscal 
burden of energy uses, the road was open for the so-called Rippa di Menea initiative.  
 
This initiative is to be understood in the context of the formation of the Single Market and in the 
perspective of a unique currency. The context created a need for harmonizing the policies of the 
European countries. Contrary to the energy field, the environment was one of the recognized areas 
for common policies. Symptomatically, the European White Book on Growth and Employment 
advocated the importance of a synergy between growth, the environment and employment. 
 
The internal consistency of the Rippa di Mennea proposal was strong and articulated several levels 
of argumentation typically representative of the linkages between climate policies and other strategic 
objectives: 
* the prolongation of energy policies and disciplines adopted during the two oil shocks: the inverted 
oil shock in the middle of the eighties could, indeed, discourage any new progress in direction to 
energy efficiency and to carbon free energy supply; would the period of low oil prices last too long, 
the European countries might be incited to come back to the pre-1973 situation, namely a high 
fragility of their economy in case of a new oil shock, 
* strategic interests vis-a-vis the US: climate change is an issue on which the US cannot be anything 
but in a defensive position, because of a very high level of per capita emissions which is, probably, 
non replicable all over the planet; to put a credible proposal on a world scene would have two 
positive outcomes: either this proposal would be withdrawn in the exchange of concession on the 
hard discussions for the building of the World Trade Organization, or the proposal would be 
accepted and Europe would benefit from this first US effort towards an internal discipline in terms of 
fossil fuel consumption  
* the possibility of taking advantage of this international tax to swap energy taxes for some other 
taxation and to yield a so-called double-dividend of environmental policies, in order to protect the 
welfare society in an opened and competitive economy. 
 
But, the formal European proposal was withdrawn a few weeks before the Rio Earth Summit without 
any attempt to impose it to the US and even without any attempt to use it diplomatically as a symbol 
of a will to act. This withdrawal highlights one of the constant difficulties in building a European 
leadership in environmental affairs, i.e., the gap between the discourses at the elaboration stage in 
the European formal arena, and the reality of wills and interests of European economic actors and 
political representatives when the time for effective decision approaches.  
 
This cannot but raise the question of to what extent the internal elaboration mechanisms of EU 
policy are undermined by an unbalanced representation of interests and visions of the world which is 
revealed at the last minute, at the moment of truth when the apparent consensus about generous ideas 
breaks down. 
 
Some economic rhetoric was voiced against the ecotax approach: distorsions in international 
competitiveness; non-effectiveness of price signals, and theoretical inconsistency of the  double-
dividend. This set of counter-arguments against an ecotax would not have sufficed in undermining 
the support of the tax approach in the EU without the specific intellectual and political conditions 
inhibiting the emergence of pro-active alliances in any EU country and between some key countries.  
 
To sketch the major determinants of an EU leadership over that time period, we have to reduce a 
complex multidimensional game into a set of key players. In principle, given the lessons of 
economic analysis, the game is rather simple. On one side, the ministries of the environment and the 
ecological movements and the labor-intensive industries should be in favor of an ecotax. On the 
other side, high energy intensive industries should be against the tax. The finance ministries should 
be in a rather neutral wait-and-see position. 
 
In terms of countries, the positions were a priori clear: France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands 
were in favor of some form of tax approach, while the Southern Countries were reluctant. Even if 
this may be contradicted by a general equilibrium analysis of the feedbacks of such measures, the 
perception by these countries of their own interest was that to place the same level of taxation on 
each country irrespective of their development level and of the emissions per capita would be 
inequitable unless compensatory measures are accepted; the level of the common ecotax is indeed a 
tangible metric of the marginal cost, while the general equilibrium feed-backs, however real they 
may be, are intangible and appear only in the artefacts of economic models. As to the position of the 
UK, it was to repeatedly reject any compulsory harmonization of taxation. 
 
In fact, the outcome of this game was greatly determined by the contrast between the looseness of 
the official advocates of the ecotax approach and the constancy of its contradictors. This contrast can 
be explained by the following parameters: 
* In many member countries, finance administrations supported only mildly the idea of ecological 
taxes for two sets of reasons. The first is the vanishing fiscal basis hypothesis. A carbon tax is indeed 
meant to cut down its own basis. In fiscal theory, a good tax has to be levied on very inelastic 
activities, both for reasons of minimizing welfare losses and for reasons of predictability of the 
government revenues. This posture can be criticized on the grounds that energy consumption is 
rather easily foreseeable from one year to the next. Also, any tax basis vanishes beyond a certain 
point: for example, payroll taxes may create a disincentive for employment, may trigger a labor 
saving technical change, and capital taxation may provide incentive for relocation of activities. The 
second reason explaining the lack of support for the ecotax was that finance departments have 
cultivated the idea that taxes and charges do not and should not have an incentive effect, with few 
exceptions such as taxes on tobacco or alcohol. At the root, this position comes from the political 
necessity to block, from the outset, the multiplication of proposals of fiscal basis under the pretext 
that on this basis, taxes may have an incentive effect and a positive economic outcome over the long 
run. Would any tax be justified on such grounds, this would make it more difficult to impose a 
minimum discipline on public expenditures. 
* Model and analysts suggest that a swap between an ecotax and a labor tax would affect adversely 
only 10 to 15% of firms in the industry, depending on the country and the level of transfers to non 
wage revenues. While most of the industry benefits from modest reductions, those hit face 
significant costs increases. This raises a negotiation problem. It becomes impossible to give credit to 
the representatives of the whole of the industrial interest in every country. The winners of reform 
may be far less concerned, informed and organized than the potential losers. This imbalance in the 
representation issue was all the more acute that no provision was made in the first versions of the EU 
proposal to take some guarantees against ecological dumping. 
* Moreover, the fiscal neutrality of the reform, which conditions the occurrence of a double-
dividend, was not guaranteed in the eyes of business representatives. This lack of credibility, which 
was grounded on concerns about the mismanagement of money by public administration, was 
legitimated by two contextual features. First, the Ripa de Menea proposal and the following 
discussions raise a fundamental problem of competence and subsidiaries. If higher energy taxes were 
adopted under the pressure of a European process, there would be no certainty that the revenues of 
such taxes would be recycled to achieve a tax neutrality, because such a recycling has to be under the 
authority of national governments, not Europe. In other words, the fact that no agreement, and hence 
no commitment, could be made on the type of recycling, facilitated the caricature of the ecotax into 
an additional fiscal burden legitimated by environmental pretexts. Second, this argument was 
reinforced in 1994 by the occurrence of the Maastricht convergence criteria which determined the 
eligibility to the Euro monetary sphere. These criteria comprised the limitation of public deficits to 
3% of the GDP and the concern of the industry was that this new source of revenues would be used 
by the governments to meet these criteria, instead of decreasing public expenditures. 
* Politically, with a low-profile UK position, the success of the ecotax proposal was conditional 
upon a common pro-active position of France and Germany. At this point, the differences in the 
perception of nuclear risks in France and Germany represented one of the big obstacles towards a 
common approach. France suggested a progressive carbon tax in 1991. Contrary to the French 
approach in favor of a pure carbon tax, the European proposal consisted of a mixed tax, based both 
on the energy content and on the carbon content. The purpose of this balance was to account for a 
widely shared concern in European countries (and especially in Germany) about the short and long 
term risks of the nuclear power. This central point was continuously criticized by French officials. 
On one side, some pro-nuclear advocates were unprepared to accept the idea of a mixed tax, 
claiming that the problem at stake was global warming, and nothing else. Technically, a compromise 
was possible since the mixed carbon-energy tax, far from weakening the competitiveness of the 
nuclear energy, resulted in a higher burden for the electricity produced by fossil fuels; moreover, a 
compromise was possible around a share above 50% for the carbon content. But ideologically this 
would have come to recognize that nuclear energy is not environmentally friendly and is the only 
response over the long run. On the other side, the anti-nuclear and ecologists movements in France 
did not support the government official position, as they suspected an implicit encouragement to 
nuclear power everywhere in the world. 
 
These conflicts created a situation in which the French government suddenly stopped any support to 
the EU proposal one month before the Rio Conference. Other member countries did not support the 
text further. This dropping of the Rippa de Menea proposal paved the way to a specific solution in 
Germany and in the Netherlands where the basic tool of climate policies in the industry would be the 
voluntary agreements. 
 
4.2. From Rio 1992 to Berlin: the diplomatic timing and the adoption of binding targets 
 
In the absence of articulated economic proposals to mitigate climate change, the EU could not 
pretend to exert a leadership through a demonstrative effect apt to force the USA to take its 
responsibility and to provide some guarantees to developing countries that the challenge was taken 
seriously into account. From the perspective of a developing country, there was no real difference in 
the concrete proposals of the three key players in the North (the USA, the EU and Japan). This 
resulted in the unbinding commitments by countries of the Annex 1 of the Climate Convention to 
stabilize their emission in 2000 at their level of 1990. 
 
Note that these non-differentiated targets are neither economically efficient nor equitable, given the 
huge discrepancies in the emissions levels per capita or per Gross National Product in the Annex I 
countries. The unbinding character of these claimed targets facilitated their adoption, even by 
countries that were very reluctant to act, and it was felt politically useless and dangerous to launch a 
quarrel about targets without real consequences over the short term. This form of commitment was 
the only way to save face in the absence of alternative proposals about price signals. This diplomatic 
fait accompli, in fact, framed the future Kyoto protocol. 
 
Just after 1992, the possibility of an approach in terms of coordinated policies and measures 
(including carbon taxes) were not ruled out. But it was undermined by contradictory political 
agendas in the US and in the EU. 
 
In the USA, the new democratic administration tried to impose an energy tax. Its implementation 
was blocked because of a wave of demands for exemptions by the industry; this wave being 
triggered when the administration accepted such exemptions for a very few sectors and had little 
ground to refuse other exemptions. This type of perspective remained on the agenda despite the 
political risks specific for the American reflex against taxation, and could have benefited from a 
diplomatic push by the European countries in the context of the follow up of the FCCC. In other 
words the coordinated policies and measures remained on stand-by. 
 
The alternative solution, the use of emissions trading systems, was increasingly analyzed in the US 
economic and business circles, but with some ambiguities: for many apparent supporters in the 
industry, this was to escape a tax system and it was unclear that industry was really ready to accept 
emissions cap. Moreover, the need for flexibility (see above, end of subsection 3.4 on Efficiency) 
was increasingly argued, but it was unclear whether the US industry was really ready to support the 
setting up of international trading systems and was really convinced by the potentials for joint 
implementation projects in countries in transition and in the developing countries. In other words, the 
balance between the two options remained very unstable. 
 
During the same period, however, the perspective of coordinated policies and measures (including 
price signals) remained in a paradoxical situation in the EU. Formally combating climate change 
through this approach remained the sole strategy discussed within the European Community in the 
delegations of the European Commission in charge of climate policies and in the meetings of the 
Ministries of the Environment. Beyond the strict climate policy elaboration, discussions about the 
harmonization of the excise taxes as a good substitute to the ecotax were actively carried out up to 
the Essen meeting in 1994. 
 
At the Berlin conference in 1995, the importance of the wording of the Rio unbinding commitments 
appeared. This Conference of Parties could not check that the Annex 1 countries were on track to 
meet their claimed unbinding objectives. From a purely economic viewpoint, the logical outcome of 
such a diagnosis might have been that quantitative targets are ineffective in the absence of 
coordinated policies and measures, and that the Berlin Mandate should be to set up the rules for such 
an approach. The US delegation was apparently prepared to negotiate on this ground, but no real 
proposal about how to co-ordinate policies and measures was made by the EU countries, because of 
the very absence of any progress in that direction at the Community level.  
 
Then, under the pressure of very active Non-Governmental Organizations and under the control of 
developing countries, the logical reflex was to ask the Annex 1 countries to transform their emissions 
targets into binding commitments and to update them as a  function of the emissions trends after 
1990, and also of the new scientific evidence of the anthropogenic nature of global warming. As the 
organizing country, Germany was at ease with such a perspective, since it claimed that the objectives 
put it on a stance of moral and intellectual leadership. 
 
The US resistance to such an outcome could not lead to a diplomatic failure and the US delegation 
decided to derive the better profit of the circumstances by accepting the inscription of binding targets 
into the Berlin Mandate towards Kyoto with the idea that such targets would open the way to 
generalized trading systems and joint implementation mechanisms, the so-called flexibility 
mechanisms discussed above. Part of the US administration indeed perceived that it would be 
politically easiest to make the climate policy adopted in the US under the rhetoric of trading systems, 
that under this coordinated policies and measures would, in whatever form, have incorporated a 
carbon taxation. 
 
4.3. Tentative assessment of Kyoto quantitative targets 
 
Kyoto targets, broadly recalled in Table 3, are interpreted in very opposite ways by various stake-
holders: in the US, opponents to any mitigation policy argue that they result from a pure political 
bargain and will entail dramatic costs for society. Symmetrically, many environmental non-
governmental organizations express the concern that the adopted targets may not be ambitious 
enough to enforce a real precautionary principle with respect to climate risks. 
 
Table 3. Contemporary fossil CO2 emissions (Mt C per year), after Bolin (1998). 
 
Figure 2. Global CO2 emission pathways consistent with long-term stabilization of CO2 
concentration at 550 ppmv. The S550 and W550 trajectories illustrate two extreme attitudes with 
respect to early action. The U550 curve illustrates a sequential decision-making strategy. It assumes 
that the 550 ppmv target is only an expected value, to be revised in 2020 at 450, 550 or 650 ppmv ; 
and it minimizes the present value of reduction cost using the DIAM model. 
 
Figure 2 compares the CO2 emissions trajectory corresponding to the Kyoto targets (curve labelled 
K) to different strategies proposed in the timing debate.  
 
First, one can see that the emission Kyoto profile is well below the reference emission profile R 
following the IPCC scenario IS92a. Note that this reference profile does not match the observed 
evolution for 1990-1995 in Table 3: actual emission growth has been less than that described in the 
IS92a scenario. But, ongoing revisions of the IPCC scenarios suggest that the 1990-1995 time period 
may be very specific (among other reasons, the economic collapse of ex-centrally planned 
economies) and that business as usual emissions for Annex I may be steadily increasing over the 
IS92 scenario. Thus, Kyoto targets do represent a significant departure from likely trends. 
 
Second, the K curve is also well below the W curve, defined by following the R path until 2010 and 
stabilizing CO2 concentrations at the 550 ppmv level. Admittedly, that W path is closer to an 
economically rational emission path towards a 550 ppmv target than the S trajectory. The latter is 
defined by using an inverse carbon cycle model to find the smooth emission path consistent with a 
given concentration profile leading to stabilization at 550 ppmv. 
 
Third, the K curve is also below the U curves, which represent an optimal precautionary strategy 
given that the ultimate concentration ceiling is determined only in 2020 between 450, 550 and 650 
ppmv. This U curve corresponds to a subjective probability distribution, equally weighing the three 
ceilings. 
 
This gives a first interpretation of the Kyoto targets: the position of the K curve below the U curve 
suggests that more weight was implicitly given to 450 ppmv than to 650 ppmv, as if policy-makers 
had retained an option value for preserving the environment and accounted for environmental 
irreversibility, technological dependent learning and risk aversion. In this sense, Kyoto targets can be 
seen as rather ambitious and revealing a real attempt to translate a precautionary approach in the face 
of unknown risks. 
 
The concern emerges from many quarters that globally, the Kyoto targets may not be ambitious 
enough to significantly mitigate climate change. Quantitatively, model simulations illustrated in 
Figure 2 tend to demonstrate the contrary. Kyoto targets are consistent with the option of staying 
below a 2oC rise in global warming, and do not preclude the possibility of shifting from an 
intermediate 550 ppmv target towards a more ambitious 450 ppmv target with reasonable costs if 
future scientific information demonstrates that such a shift is required. 
 
5. Concluding remarks  
 
In conclusion, the distinction between action and abatement is critical to clarify policy debates. 
Abatement corresponds to quantitative emission reduction targets over a given time period, but a 
quantitative target is not a good indicator of the relevance of policies over the long run. Immediate 
action corresponds to enhanced research and development, and infra-structural efforts. They 
contribute little to the abatement of greenhouse gases emissions over the short to medium term, but 
these efforts are required in order to be able to abate more, faster and cheaper in the future.  
 
At the aggregate level, the Kyoto targets are compatible with precautionary strategies against a 2oC 
rise in global warming. They would trigger a shift towards lower levels of greenhouse gases 
emissions, which is apt to avoid passing a too heavy burden to future generations. The problem is not 
that the Protocol is not strict enough, rather that the Protocol may not be enforced at all. 
 
Quantitative targets over the short and medium run are not a good indicator of the sustainability over 
the long run: the short-term Kyoto targets do not assure any long-term climate stabilization. Even if, 
technically, Kyoto targets could then be met without investments into low- and zero-carbon 
technology research and development and in sustainable transportation infrastructure development, 
these actions could be unacceptable from the point of view of future generations', as it narrows their 
future response options by increasing technological and infra-structural inertia. 
 
If one looks at the dynamics behind the aggregate figures, there is no certainty that, while respecting 
their emissions assignment, developed countries will not be trapped in emission paths, which will 
make it difficult to adopt tighter abatement targets beyond 2012. Behind what appears technically to 
be a dynamic consistency problem due to the dynamics in rigid sectors, such as transportation or 
housing, lies the sensitive issue of long-term innovation and the evolution of life styles. If domestic 
policies and measures are not adopted in due time in developed countries, the emergence of GHG 
trading systems may then create a masking effect which will end in a failure of climate policies. 
 
This risk is all the more important because the entry of  developing countries within Annex B will be 
necessary after 2012. Due to the non-observability of emission baselines, any such entry may 
generate a new wave of excess assigned amounts, resulting in low carbon prices over the long run 
and in the absence of any incentive to curb down real emissions trends.  
 
There were at the outset of the nineties two competing approaches to climate negotiation. The first 
was to try and coordinate policies and measures without pretending to set up quantitative targets; the 
second was to set up targets. The latter was finally adopted because it provided an apparent level of 
guarantee of action to environmental Non-Governmental Organizations, while avoiding in practice 
the difficult debate about the coordinated policies and measures. The mix of medium term targets 
and flexibility mechanisms adopted at Kyoto in turn does not guarantee that the ultimate objective 
will be fulfilled. 
 
This consideration, plus the difficulty of encouraging developing countries to adopt quantitative 
targets without assigning them emission amounts above their baseline, should lead to a 
reconsideration. For the period beyond 2012, an approach in terms of coordinated policies and 
measures (including higher energy prices) may be the only real guarantee of achieving the objective 
of the FCCC. Could this be done within the framework of the Convention and the Protocol, since to 
re-negotiate it would certainly be politically impractical? Our opinion is that the phrasing of the 
Protocol is flexible enough for this. 
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Glossary 
 
Annex I Parties: Annex I parties are committed to adopt national policies and take measures to 
mitigate climate change. Annex I of the United Nations FCCC comprises countries who were 
members of the OECD in 1992, countries undergoing the process of transition to a market 
economy, and the European Economic Community. 
Capital stocks: The accumulation of machines and structures that are available to an economy at 
any point in time to produce goods or render services. These activities usually require a 
quantity of energy that is determined largely by the rate at which that machine or structure is 
used. 
Climate: Climate is usually defined as the "average weather", or more rigorously, as the statistical 
description of the weather in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over 
periods of several decades (typically three decades as defined by WMO). These quantities are 
most often surface variables such as temperature, precipitation, and wind, but in a wider 
sense the "climate" is the  description of the state of the climate system. 
Climate change: (UNFCCC usage) A change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to 
human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition 
to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods. 
Damage function: The relation between changes in the climate and reductions in economic activity 
relative to the rate that would be possible in an unaltered climate. 
Discount rate: The annual rate at which the effect of future events are reduced, so as to be 
comparable to the effect of present events. 
Emission Permit: A non-transferable or tradable allocation of entitlements by a government to an 
individual firm to emit a specified amount of a substance. 
Emission Quota: The portion or share of total allowable emissions assigned to a country or group of 
countries within a framework of maximum total emissions and mandatory allocations of 
resources or assessments. 
Energy Intensity: Ratio of energy consumption and economic or physical output. At the national 
level, energy intensity is the ratio of total domestic primary energy consumption or final 
energy con sumption to gross domestic product or physical output. 
Equivalent CO2: The concentration of CO2 that would cause the same amount of radiative forcing 
as the given mixture of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. 
Fossil CO2 emissions: This includes all anthropogenic contributions to the net atmospheric carbon 
budget, except for those classified as associated with land-use change. In practice, the 
contributions are those from fossil fuel combustion (including gas flaring) and cement 
production. 
GHGs: Greenhouse gases 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product, the value of all goods and services produced (or consumed) within a 
nation's borders. 
GNP: Gross National Product, the value of all goods and services produced (or consumed) by all 
members of a nation. 
GtC: Gigatonnes of carbon (1 GtC = 3.7 Gt carbon dioxide) 
IIASA: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
Integrated assessment: A method of analysis that combines results and models from the physical, 
biological, economic and social sciences, and the interactions between these components, in a 
consistent framework, to project the consequences of climate change and the policy 
responses to it. 
IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  
Marginal cost: The cost of one additional unit of effort. In terms of reducing emissions, it represents 
the cost of reducing emissions by one more unit. 
Market-based incentives: Measures intended to directly change relative prices of energy services 
and overcome market barriers. 
Measures: Actions that can be taken by a government or a group of governments, often in 
conjunction with the private sector, to accelerate the use of technologies or other practices 
that reduce GHG emissions. 
Non-market damages: Damages generated by climate change (or some other environmental 
change) and that cannot be evaluated by a competitive market because of a lack of 
information and/or the inability to act on that information. 
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Opportunity Cost: The cost of an economic activity foregone by the choice of another activity. 
Optimal control rate: The rate of intervention at which the net present value of the marginal costs 
of the intervention, equals the net present value of the marginal benefits of the intervention. 
Policies: Procedures developed and implemented by government(s) regarding the goal of mitigating 
climate change through the use of technologies and measures. 
ppmv: Parts per million (106)  by volume 
Precautionary principle: When there is a large or irreversible risk, the precautionary principle 
implies that a lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a pretext for doing nothing. 
Regulatory Measures: Rules or codes enacted by governments that mandate product specifications 
or process performance characteristics. 
Research, Development and Demonstration: Scientific/technical research and development of new 
production processes or products, coupled with analysis and measures that provide 
information to potential users regarding the application of the new product or process; 
demonstration tests the feasibility of applying these products or processes via pilot plants and 
other pre-commercial applications. 
Scenario: A plausible description of how the future may develop, based on a coherent and internally 
consistent set of assumptions about key relationships and driving forces (e.g., rate of 
technology changes, prices). Note that scenarios are neither predictions nor forecasts. 
Structural Changes: Changes, for example, in the relative share of GDP produced by the industrial, 
agricultural or services sectors of an economy; or, more generally, systems transformations 
whereby some components are either replaced or partially substituted by other ones. 
Sustainable development: Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 
tC: Tonnes of carbon  
UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
WEC: World Energy Council 
"When" and "where" flexibility: The ability to choose the time (when) or location (where) of a 
mitigation option or adaptation scheme in order to reduce the costs associated with climate 
change. 
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